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Collective Goals

background: goals

intention vs goal

But doesn’t a goal necessarily require an intention?

... or a motor representation.

A goal is an outcome to which an action is directed.

How should we understand directedness? In terms of the problems solving which
Because the instrumental process (+motor processes) solves several of these problems, we can see it as underpinning instrumental action.
And, going the other way, because the instrumental process solves several these problems, we can be more confident that they belong together and therefore that characterising instrumental action in this way will be fruitful.

Which outcomes are achievable?

For each outcome, which means of achieving it are available?

Of the various means of achieving a given outcome, which best balance cost against well-suitedness?

Of the achievable outcomes, which best balance cost against expected benefit?

Having settled on an outcome and means, when should these be maintained?

---

For an action to be directed to an outcome is for it to occur because there is one or more outcome in relation to which problems such as these have been, or appear to have been, solved.

Which things are actions?

mechanistically committed

Those things caused by intentions are intentional actions.

Those things which are appropriately related to an intention, or to a belief-desire pair, or to some other state of an agent, are intentional actions.

...

Objection 1

habitual processes

Some actions run counter to any of the agent’s intentions because they are dominated by habitual processes.

Objection 2

motor processes

Invoking motor representations yields a solution to the problem of action that is no worse than the Standard Solution.

Which things are actions?

mechanistically committed

Those things caused by intentions are intentional actions.

Those things which are appropriately related to an intention, or to a belief-desire pair, or to some other state of an agent, are intentional actions.

...

mechanistically neutral

Those things directed to an outcome are purposive actions.

Those purposive actions which happen because of a reason favouring the outcome’s occurrence are intentional actions.

...

Objection 1

habitual processes

Some actions run counter to any of the agent’s intentions because they are dominated by habitual processes.

Objection 2

motor processes

Invoking motor representations yields a solution to the problem of action that is no worse than the Standard Solution.

Brand, 1984

a different approach

1. Which things are actions (as opposed to mere happenings)?

2. Which states or processes enable agents to act?

collective goals

intention vs goal

goal is an outcome ...

goals in joint action?

Standard approach is to focus on the joint analog of intentions, namely shared intentions.
Can we focus on something like goals instead?

common goal

A common goal is is a single goal to which the agents’ actions are directed.
[Can illustrate common vs collective goal with current political situation in which the actions of bitter rivals may have a common goal but no collective goal (unlike the political allies).]
This is still not enough. To see why, suppose that the strangers’ actions are no longer coordinated and they are walking different routes to their gate, but that each stranger is concerned that the Marseille flight should leave on time. As each sees it, the only thing she can do to this end is to walk to the gate. Her actions are therefore directed to the same goal as the other’s: to ensure the Marseille flight leaves on time.
So there is one goal to which each of their actions are directed; that is, a common goal. I suspect we still haven’t captured what talk of a ‘we mode’ aims at.
*todo — can use 'joint_action_davidson_primitive_basic/slide44.jpg' here (Nora and Olive have a common goal but this is arguably not a joint action)

collective goal

‘The injections saved her life.’ [distributive vs collective]

Consider the statement, ‘The injections saved her life.’ This could be true in virtue of her receiving several injections on different occasions, each of which saved her life. In this case, the injections saving her life is just a matter of each injection individually saving her life; this is the distributive interpretation. But the statement is also true if she was given two injections on a single occasion where each injection was necessary but not sufficient to save her life. In this case the injections saving her life is not, or not just, a matter of each injection individually saving her life; this is the collective interpretation.
The difference between distributive and collective interpretations is clearly substantial, for on the distributive interpretation the statement can only be true if her life has been saved more than once, whereas the truth of the collective interpretation requires only one life-threatening situation.
Just as some injections can be collectively life-saving, so some actions can be collectively directed to a goal. For example, consider this sentence:

‘The goal of their actions is to find a new home.’

This can be interpreted distributively: each of their actions is separately directed to finding a new home. But it can also be interpreted collectively: finding a home is an outcome to which their actions are directed and this is not, or not just, a matter of each of their actions being individually directed to finding a home.
To say that an outcome is a \emph{collective goal} of some actions is just to say that it is an outcome to which the actions are directed and this is not, or not just, a matter of each action being individually directed to that outcome.
No mechanisms! Separate the thing to be explained from the thing which explains it.
Note that collective goals do not plausibly require any kind of intentions or commitments. After all, there is a sense in which some of the actions of swarming bees are directed to finding a nest and this is not, or not just, a matter of each bee’s actions being individually directed to finding a nest. So finding a nest is a collective goal of the bees’ actions.

commongoaldistributiveinterpretationcollectivegoalcollectiveinterpretation

How could some agents’ actions have a collective goal?

Step 2: how could our actions have a collective goal?

If

there is a single outcome, G, such that

(a) our actions are coordinated; and

(b) coordination of this type would normally increase the probability that G occurs.

then

there is an outcome to which our actions are directed where this is not, or not only, a matter of each action being directed to that outcome,

i.e.

our actions have a collective goal.

problem of action problem of joint action we do need shared intention Bratman's planning theory Pacherie's team reason- ing theory collective goals we don't need shared intention dyadic motor plans we do need intention motor representa- tion habitual processes we don't need intention } }

joint action

What is the relation between a joint action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is collectively directed?

Could motor representations also ground this relation?

ordinary, individual action

What is the relation between an instrumental action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed?

Motor representations ground this relation.