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Introduction

essay questions related to todays lecture

How, if at all, should a philosophical theory of action incorporate scientific discoveries about the control of action?

Could some motor representations be intentions?

Which psychological structures enable agents to coordinate their plans? What if anything do these mechanisms reveal about how acting together differs from acting in parallel but merely individually?

How, if at all, should a philosophical theory of acting together incorporate scientific discoveries about the interpersonal coordination of action?

problem of action problem of joint action we do need shared intention Bratman's planning theory Pacherie's team reason- ing theory collective goals we don't need shared intention dyadic motor plans we do need intention motor representa- tion habitual processes we don't need intention } }
This is one thing we will explore today
Will need to do this, but first ...

problem of action

‘The history of philosophical reflection on action gives the distinction between activity and passivity different names, and attempts to explain the distinction in different ways.

But philosophers circle the distinction repeatedly [...].

Aristotle wants to know the difference between being cut and cutting.

Hobbes wants to know the difference between vital motions, like the motion of the blood, and voluntary motion, as in bodily action.

Wittgenstein wants to know the difference between my arm going up and my raising it.’

(Shepherd, 2021, p. 1)

‘Now what is an action? Not one thing, but a series of two things: the state of mind called a volition, followed by an effect. The volition or intention to produce the effect, is one thing; the effect produced in consequence of the intention, is another thing; the two together constitute the action.’

Mill, System of Logic (1.3.6) quoted in Hyman (2015, p. 218)

actions have parts which are themselves instrumental actions

Intention to produce the effect
Speech actions also complex ...
And those component actions are instrumental ...
Each phonetic gesture involves a complex, coordinated movement of lips, larynx, tounge and velum that is sensitive to context.

Jusczyk (1997, p. 44)

A \emph{very small scale action} is one that is typically distantly related as a descendent by the means-end relation to the actions which are sometimes described as ‘small scale’ actions, such as playing a sonata, cooking a meal or painting a house (Bratman, 2014, p. 8).

instrumental actions

Small Scale

Very Small Scale

adding the egg to the mix

grasping the egg

uttering a word

making a phonetic gesture

Why care about very small scale instrumental actions?

Josh’s book mentions reaching just a few times, and more often in a metaphorical sense than in a literal one.
John’s book mentions grasping only in a metaphorical sense.
But we should care about them because (i) they are instrumental actions (they have a goal and can succeed or fail relative to that goal); (ii) they typically involve complex, temporally extended coordination; and (iii) there is a tricky question to answer about them ...

What is the relation between an instrumental action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed?

intention

The outcome is related to the action via an intention.

The intention specifies an outcome.

The intention causes the actions in a way that would normally increase the probability of the specified outcome ocurring.

<-- does not work for very small scale actions

(in general, there may be some exceptions)

(also, habitual processes will not solve this)

Becaues they are about stimulus-action links, where the action is specified as an outcome.
(Can make some progress by having chains of actions linked together by habitual processes; but will still bottom out in very small scale instumental actions.)

plan

1. What is the relation between a very small scale instrumental action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed?

2. How, if at all, does answering this question challenge the Standard Answer to the Problem of Action?

3. Is there a parallel set of issues concerning joint action?

Any questions about the plan? Take a break.
strong preference weak preference indifferent weak preference strong preference 2 hours 2 x 1 hours different days

plan

1. What is the relation between a very small scale instrumental action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed?

2. How, if at all, does answering this question challenge the Standard Answer to the Problem of Action?

3. Is there a parallel set of issues concerning joint action?