Objections to the Simple Theory of Joint Action

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Objections to the Simple Theory of Joint Action

Bratman offers a counterexample to something related to the Simple Theory (Bratman, 1992; Bratman, 2014). Suppose that you and I each intend that we, you and I, go to New York together. But your plan is to point a gun at me and bundle me into the boot (or trunk) of your car. Then you intend that we go to New York together, but in a way that doesn't depend on my intentions. As you see things, I'm going to New York with you whether I like it or not. Does this provide the basis for an objection to the Simple Theory?

The Simple Theory

Two or more agents perform an intentional joint action
exactly when there is an act-type, φ, such that
each agent intends that
they, these agents, φ together
and their intentions are appropriately related to their actions.

Here’s the Simple Theory again. My aim now is to present the most convincing objection to it that I can.

Bratman’s ‘mafia case’

Michael Bratman offers a counterexample to something related to the Simple Theory. Suppose that you and I each intend that we, you and I, go to New York together. But your plan is to point a gun at me and bundle me into the boot (or trunk) of your car. Then you intend that we go to New York together, but in a way that doesn't depend on my intentions. As you see things, I'm going to New York with you whether I like it or not. This doesn't seem like the basis for shared agency. After all, your plan involves me being abducted.

But it is still a case in which we each intend that we go to New York together and we do. So, apparently, the conditions of the Simple Theory are met (or almost met) and yet there is no shared agency.

1. I intend that we, you and I, go to NYC together.

2. You intend that we, you and I, go to NYC together.

3. You intend that we, you and I, go to NYC together by way of you forcing me into the back of my car.

Is this a good counterexample? If not, why not

We’re considering that Bratman’s ‘mafia case’ provides a counterexample to the Simple Theory. But does it really?

The mafia case fails as a counterexample to the Simple Theory because if you go through with your plan, my actions won’t be appropriately related to my intention.

And, on the other hand, if you don’t go through with your plan, that it is at best unclear that your having had that plan matters for whether we have shared agency.

I suggest that what is wrong in the Mafia Case is not that the agent’s need further intentions, but just that if their intentions don’t connect to their actions in the right way then there won’t be intentional joint action.

But the mafia case fails as a counterexample to the Simple Theory because if you go through with your plan, my actions won’t be appropriately related to my intention.

And, on the other hand, if you don’t go through with your plan, that it is at best unclear that your having had that plan matters for whether we exercise shared agency.

Bratman uses the Mafia case to motivate adding further intentions to those specified by the Simple Theory. But I suggest that an alternative response to the Mafia case is no less adequate and simpler: what is wrong in the Mafia Case is not that the agents need further intentions, but just that, if they act as they intend, their intentions won’t all be appropriately related to their actions.

So Bratman’s ‘mafia case’ is not a counterexample to the Simple Theory.

I note that Bratman is clearly aiming to identify intentions whose fulfilment requires shared agency. But I don’t think this is necessary. It seems to me that what matters is that the Simple Theory as a whole distingiushes shared agency from parallel but merely individual agency, not that it does so by way of fulfilment conditions of intentions.

Rather than continuing to discuss whether the Mafia case really motivates rejecting the Simple Theory, let me consider other ways to generate what seem to be more plausible candidates for counterexamples to the Simple Theory ...

Walking together in the Tarantino sense

Here is my attempt to improve on Bratman’s counterexample. Contrast friends walking together in the way friends ordinarily walk, which is a paradigm example of joint action, with two gangsters who walk together like this ...

... Gangster 1 pulls a gun on Gangster 2 and says: “let’s walk” But Gangster 2 does the same thing to Gangster 1 simultaneously.

We might call this ‘walking together in the Tarrantino sense’.

The conditions of the Simple Theory are met both in ordinary walking together and in walking together in the Tarantino sense. [*Discuss ‘appropriately related’]. So according to the Simple Theory, both are intentional joint actions.

1. I intend that we, you and I, walk together.

2. You intend that we, you and I, walk together.

The interdependence of the guns means that our actions can be appropriately related to our intentions.

Now I wanted to say that walking together in the Tarantino sense is not an intentional joint action unless the central event of Reservoir Dogs is also a case of joint action. And I think it’s pretty clear that that isn’t a joint action. But I was surprised to find that at least two people responded, independently of each other, to this suggestion by saying that walking together in the Tarantino sense really is a joint action.

My opponent reasoned that each is acting intentionally, and that coercion is no bar to shared agency.

the threat of collapse: trading intuitions

Just here we come to a tricky issue. There is a danger that we will just end up trying to say something systematic about one or another set of intuitions, where nothing deep underpins these intuitions.

I think this is a real threat; you’ll see that most philosophers are not careful about their starting point in theorising about shared agency. They merely give examples or a couple of contrast cases and off they go. Adopting this undisciplined approach risks achieving nothing more than organising one’s own intuitions. (It’s fine to organise intuitions on weekends and evenings, but it shouldn’t be your day job.)

That’s why I want to go slowly here --- maybe this is very frustrating and you want to get into the really exciting, weird and crazy stuff about plural subjects, shared emotions or aggregate animals. But before we can do this seriously we need some sort of foundation that will ensure we aren’t merely organising intuitions.

another contrast case: blocking the aisle

Imagine two sisters who, getting off an aeroplane, tacitly agree to exact revenge on the unruly mob of drunken hens behind them by standing so as to block the aisle together. This is a joint action. Meanwhile on another flight, two strangers happen to be so configured that they are collectively blocking the aisle. The first passenger correctly anticipates that the other passenger, who is a complete stranger, will not be moving from her current position for some time. This creates an opportunity for the first passenger: she intends that they, she and the stranger, block the aisle. And, as it happens, the second passenger’s thoughts mirror the first’s.

1. The sisters perform an intentional joint action; the strangers’ actions are parallel but merely individual.

2. In both cases, the conditions of the Simple Theory are met.

The feature under consideration as distinctive of joint action is present: each passenger is acting on her intention that they, the two passengers, block the aisle.

therefore:

3. The Simple Theory does not correctly answer the question, What distinguishes joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?

Explain the case to your partner. Is it really a counterexample to the Simple Theory?

Is it really a counterexample?

Recall our earlier contrast cases ...

The Simple Theory

I’ve been arguing that the Simple Theory is either outright wrong or else radically incomplete as an account of shared agency.

Apparently, it is possible for two or more agents to each intend that they do one thing together and to act on these intentions without them thereby exercising shared agency a strong-ish sense.

So the Simple Theory fails to provide a satisfying answer to the question, What distinguishes genuine joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?

Let me pause to say why this matters and how it fits into the big picture ...

Philosophers have offered a tremendous variety of incompatible, wildly complicated and conceptually innovative theories about shared agency. The Simple Theory is an obstacle to discussing these theories. If the Simple Theory is correct, none of the complexity philosophers have offered is needed.

The first problem I encounter in thinking about shared agency is that philosophers seem to take for granted without argument that the Simple Theory can be excluded. In fact it is surprisingly difficult to show that the Simple Theory is wrong. The usual argument against it is that it is circular, but we saw that this argument depends on the mistaken assumption that all cases of acting together involve joint action.

A better objection to the Simple Theory involves counterexamples. But we saw that the standard counterexample, Bratman’s mafia cases, does not work. However refining that counterexample does appear to present a problem for the Simple Theory.

Note that I don’t claim that the objection to the Simple Theory is decisive; in fact one of my aims (but not in these lectures) is to show that it is possible to save the Simple Theory. Nevertheless I do think that the objections to it are serious enough that we must now explore what proper philosophers have to say about shared agency.

Joint actions are actions with two or more agents ✘

Joint actions are events with two or more agents ✘

short essay question:

Why, if at all, do we need a theory of shared intention?

(Will be a while before this question makes sense.)

plan d’attaque

premise: Shared intention can only be understood as the solution to a problem.

1. What is the Problem of Joint Action? ✓

2. Can we solve the Problem without shared intention? ✓

3. If we do need shared intention, what is the best account available? ✓

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Objections to the Simple Theory of Joint Action

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