What Are Preferences?

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What Are Preferences?

So far we only thought about the kind of representation that is needed for decision theory. Next we need the theory itself. And the way to get to the theory is to ask, What Are Preferences?

Striking that this is how Jeffrey describes the aim of the book.

This book has ‘a philosophical end: elucidation of the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility’

(Jeffrey, 1983, p. xi)

This is very useful because we have so far assumed without explicating these notions, both in the philosophical theory and in the dual-process theory ...

Jeffrey will help us to understand Belief and Desire

This is important for linking decision theory with belief-desire. (Decision theory as a theory about the patterns humans find in behaviour (vs as a theory about the patterns that actually are in behaviour).)

‘we should think of
meanings and beliefs
as interrelated constructs of a single theory
just as we already view
subjective values and probabilities
as interrelated constructs of decision theory’

(Davidson, 1974, p. 146)

why necessary?

You might say, I know what these things are.

will get to that later

I will return to this later ... first I want to show you the positive theory

habitual process

Action occurs in the presence of Stimulus.

Agent is rewarded [/punished] p(class=theCls)Stimulus-Action Link is strengthened [/weakened] due to reward [/punishment]

Given Stimulus, will Action occur? It depends on the strength of the Stimulus-Action Link.

‘goal-directed’ process

Action leads to Outcome.

Belief in Action-Outcome link is strengthened.

Agent has a Desire for the Outcome

Will Action occur? It depends on the Belief in the Action-Outcome Link and Agent’s Desire.

This book has ‘a philosophical end: elucidation of the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility’

(Jeffrey, 1983, p. xi)

ok, so how is this done?

Difference scenario, bananas or chocolate. Both subjective probabilities and preferences unknown to us.

Subject opens the red door. What can we conclude? That they like bananas more than chocolate? Not necessarily.

I mean, if we knew their subjective probabilties, then maybe we could conclude that they like bananas more than chocolate.

But we don’t know their subjective probabilities. Suppose their subjective probabilities were like this. Then their choice does not tell us that they prefer bananas to chocolate.

cannot infer preferences unless we know subjective probabilities

revealed preferences Importance: transition from externally given criterion

‘the revealed preference revolution of the 1930s (Samuelson, 1938)

... replaced the supposition that people are attempting to optimize any externally given criterion (e.g., some psychologically interpretable motion of utility, perhaps to be quantified in units of pleasure and pain).

Chater (2014)

Up to this point we regarded decision theory as forward looking ...

TODO: Can’t remember how you figure out that agent is not indifferent between A and B. (Is this an axiom?)

‘Suppose that A and B are consequences between which the agent is not indifferent, and that N is an ethically neutral condition [i.e. the agent is indifferent between N and not N].

Then N has probability 1/2 if and only if the agent is indifferent between the following two gambles:

1. B if N, A if not

2. A if N, B if not’

(Jeffrey, 1983, p. 47)

What have we done?

Your actions are a function of two things,
subjective probabilities
and preferences.

Ramsey’s method allows us to
infer both of these
from observations of the actions you perform
plus some background assumptions (axioms).

Using Steele & Stefánsson (2020, p. §2.3) here.

But what did we assume in characterising preferences?

transitivity

For any A, B, C ∈ S: if A⪯B and B⪯C then A⪯C.

(Steele & Stefánsson, 2020)

completeness

For any A, B ∈ S: either A⪯B or B⪯A

continuity

‘Continuity implies that no outcome is so bad that you would not be willing to take some gamble that might result in you ending up with that outcome [...] provided that the chance of the bad outcome is small enough.’

Suppose A⪯B⪯C. Then there is a p∈[0,1] such that: {pA, (1 − p)C} ∼ B (Steele & Stefánsson, 2020)

independence

roughly, if you prefer A to B then you should prefer A and C to B and C.

Suppose A⪯B. Then for any C, and any p∈[0,1]: {pA,(1−p)C}⪯{pB,(1−p)C}

Steele & Stefánsson (2020, p. §2.3)

things the theory
assumes

actions

outcomes

+ some background assumptions

things the theory characterises

preference

subjective probability

rationality (?!)

The axioms can be regarded as implicitly defining

preference

and

subjective probability.

More carefully,
preference and subjective probability
are constructs of decision theory.

ok but I really want to drive this home ...

We are not really interested in actually inferring. The demonstration that we can infer is what shows that the axioms are sufficient to define preference and subjective probability.

Ramsey’s method allows us to
infer both of these
from observations of the actions you perform
plus some background assumptions (axioms).

What is the evidential basis for ascribing an agent subjective probabilities and preferences and how does the evidence support the ascriptions?

For simplicity I have so far been speaking as if we wanted to introduce a procedure for deciding how to act. But of course that isn't our aim at all. Our ultimate aim is to be able to justify claims about attitudes---or at least to understand what sort of considerations might provide justification. We still have a way to go.

So far we have seen how subjective probabilities and desirabilities determine expected utilities for actions. If we knew the expected utilities of the actions available to an agent, we could make a prediction about how she will act. But to work out an agent's expected utilities we would need to know the probabilities she assigns to relevant conditions and how desirable she finds the various outcomes. How could we know this?

We are not really interested in actually inferring. The demonstration that we can infer is what shows that the axioms are sufficient to define preference and subjective probability.

Striking that this is how Jeffrey describes the aim of the book.

This book has ‘a philosophical end: elucidation of the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility’

(Jeffrey, 1983, p. xi)

‘we should think of
meanings and beliefs
as interrelated constructs of a single theory
just as we already view
subjective values and probabilities
as interrelated constructs of decision theory’

(Davidson, 1974, p. 146)

why necessary?

You might say, I know what these things are.

option 1: pre-theoretic (‘intuitive’) grounding

folk psychology

a source of common knowledge of principles

that implicitly define ‘intention’, ‘knowledge’, and the rest

Lewis (1972) vs Heider (1958)

option 1: pre-theoretic (‘intuitive’) grounding

defence: folk psychology as expertise

option 1: pre-theoretic (‘intuitive’) grounding

defence: folk psychology as expertise

To illustrate the idea, here is Ayesha thinking ...

option 1: pre-theoretic (‘intuitive’) grounding

defence: folk psychology as expertise

option 1: pre-theoretic (‘intuitive’) grounding

defence: folk psychology as expertise

But does this defence work?

There is a good reason why we should not expect to find common knowledge of principles that provide implicit definitions of notions like intention and knowledge lurking in our expertise as ordinary mindreaders

It’s just not the business of folk psychology to be providing a system of generalisations about mental states that would enable us to define them.

functions of everyday mindreading expertise:

normative

ethical

legal

self-regulative (aspirational)

predictive -- speed-accuracy trade-offs

And even if we focus narrowly on the predictive ...

The need to make predictions in a timely fashion means that we would expect to find lots of dirty heurtistics along with any principles we could extract.

...

As philosophers see
folk psychology ...

‘When someone is in so-and-so combination of mental states and receives sensory stimuli of so-and-so kind, he tends with so-and-so probability to be caused thereby to go into so-and-so mental states and produce so-and-so motor responses.’

(Lewis, 1972, p. 256)

folk psychology

a source of common knowledge of principles

that implicitly define ‘intention’, ‘knowledge’, and the rest

Lewis (1972) vs Heider (1958)

option 1: pre-theoretic (‘intuitive’) grounding

defence: folk psychology as expertise

obstacle: diversity , inter- and intra-personal

Didn’t talk about this but you have references in the notes.

ryanlynchy

When I 'do' an action such as involving a shift of attention, it seems utterly mysterious to me how I am able to generate that movement.

The mechanism of 'attentional control' seems to be hidden from my introspective awareness,

all I can really say is that I am witness to 'certain attentional processes' occurring in my experience.

If we cannot fully introspect on how we do the things we do, what does this mean for the apparent distinction between things that happen to us and things that we do?

A lot hinges on this. Maybe we need only shallow insight into our own minds to make that distinction. After all, Davidson would agree that there is much we do not know.

Just as there is a lot we do not know about the physical parameters of action (maximum grip appeture uncovered using high-speed photography).

option 1: pre-theoretic (‘intuitive’) grounding

defence: folk psychology as expertise

obstacle: diversity , inter- and intra-personal

obstacle?: lack of insight (also Nisbett & Wilson, 1977)

option 2: philosophical

distinctive = has value distinct from true belief

KNOWLEDGE	yes	no
Is it a mental state?	Williamson (2000)	Hyman (1999)
Knowing entails believing?	Rose & Schaffer (2013)	Radford (1966)
Is it a form of belief?	Sosa (2007)	Williamson (2000)
Valuable for action?	Plato’s Meno	Kaplan (1985)
Is humanly attainable?	[others]	Unger (1975)
Depends on context?	D. K. Lewis (1996)	[lots]

Which things manifest agency?

‘The paramecium’s swimming through the beating of its cilia, in a coordinated way, and perhaps its initial reversal of direction, count as agency.’

(Burge, 2009, p. 259)

Do these two have a shared understanding of agency?

Compatible claims about different things? Or incompatible claims about one thing?

Nearly everyone in philosophy thinks that, overall, the reasons favour one of these views. But we also know that philosophers have been disagreeing for a good 2000 years and that the trend is not towards disagreements being overcome through the use of reason.

option 1: pre-theoretic (‘intuitive’) grounding

defence: folk psychology as expertise

obstacle: diversity , inter- and intra-personal

option 2: philosophical

obstacle: diversity

I might easily be wrong.

A lot of philosophers do write as if researchers agree what these things are and the problem is just to provide a theoretical characterisation of them.

Indeed, for anyone taking epistemology or philosophy of mind, it’s hard to approach these subjects without supposing that researchers all have a common understanding of knowledge or belief as the targets of their theories.

But I just cannot see how that could be true.

Problem of diversity also illustrated by one of the questions this week.

username27432

According to the glossary definition, an action is instrumental if "it happens in order to bring about an outcome".

Could we argue that at least certain (if not all) thoughts are instrumental actions as well?

Are thoughts actions? (O’Brien & Soteriou, 2009)

No body so far (but later: motor representation).

In the theories we have considered so far go, the body plays no role at all.

Could we then, in a similar way, have thoughts that are caused by goal-directed processes and habitual processes?

Evidence of habitual processes in decision-making (Keramati, Smittenaar, Dolan, & Dayan, 2016)

option 1: pre-theoretic (‘intuitive’) grounding

defence: folk psychology as expertise

obstacle: diversity , inter- and intra-personal

option 2: philosophical

obstacle: diversity

Ok so as Ryan’s question shows, we also have diversity in philosophers’ views about whether thoughts are (instrumental) actions.

obstacle: n’ting good anchors philosophers’ understandings

Compare Nagel: ‘Unless there is a special reason to think that knowledge attributions work quite differently when we are reading philosophy papers - and I'll shortly survey some evidence against that sort of exceptionalism - we should expect to find that epistemic case intuitions are generated by the natural capacity responsible for our everyday attributions of states of knowledge, belief and desire. esire. This capacity has been given various labels, including 'folk psychology', 'mindreading', and 'theory of mind’’ (Nagel, 2012, p. 510).

‘epistemic case intuitions are generated by [...] folk psychology’

Nagel (2012, p. 510)

‘some part of us finds it almost impossible not to categorise them as’ agents

Steward (2009, p. 229)

Philosophical accounts of minds and actions ...

... anchor a shared understanding of what knowledge, belief, joy and the rest are.

... could be (mis)used to characterise various models of mind.

option 1: pre-theoretic (‘intuitive’) grounding

defence: folk psychology as expertise

obstacle: diversity , inter- and intra-personal

option 2: philosophical

obstacle: diversity

obstacle: n’ting good anchors philosophers’ understandings

option 3: formal (use decision theory)

obstacle: ...

This book has ‘a philosophical end: elucidation of the notions of subjective probability and subjective desirability or utility’

(Jeffrey, 1983, p. xi)

‘we should think of
meanings and beliefs
as interrelated constructs of a single theory
just as we already view
subjective values and probabilities
as interrelated constructs of decision theory’

(Davidson, 1974, p. 146)

why necessary?

You might say, I know what these things are.

for shared understanding!

What I learned about why you are here

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What Are Preferences?

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